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In March 2010, Congress approved large changes for the health care industry, including an expansion of the existing Medicaid program. This paper explores the potential fiscal impacts of this Medicaid expansion for the state of
Tennessee. First, the development of Medicaid and TennCare, the current recession, and the broader health reform law are outlined to contextualize the
Medicaid expansion. Second, the population to be covered by the expansion
is characterized to understand cost implication and reveal strategies for cost
containment and health improvement. Next, the costs of the program are estimated under set assumptions and the strength of the impact of two main variables – inflation and enrollment – are analyzed. Additionally, this section looks
at savings the state may realize as well as some corollary consequences of the
increased federal funding to the state.

Introduction
Spring 2010 in D.C. saw both the bloom of cherry blossoms and the passage of the first
national bills that address the entirety of the American health system. Rife with political
contention and questionable negotiations, the past year of debate was intensely emotional.
Facts about the legislation were often misconstrued amidst framing of the many issues
involved in the debates. Even now after its passage, many groups and politicians continue
to fight both the legislation as a whole and individual provisions within the bills. At the
same time, administrators in all levels of government and throughout the private sector are
expected to prudently implement the bill.
The purpose of this report is to aid in this implementation by exploring the costs and
factors involved in the Medicaid expansion. The aim is objectivity in considering how these
portions of the bill will unfold on the ground. As such, facts are blatantly presented; these
goals are expensive. Their effectiveness, however, will be determined in the coming years.
http://trace.tennessee.edu/pursuit
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In light of the recent passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (subsequently referred to collectively as
PPACA) as well as the lack of Tennessee-based analysis, my paper focuses on interactions
between the new law and Tennessee operations, including the budget and current policies
on Medicaid and children’s coverage. I attempt to characterize how health reform may affect Tennessee government by comparing analysis of the bills, national and state data on
budget and health indicators, and analysis of state programs and policies. By comparing,
combining, and analyzing information from these sources, a picture of the fiscal impact
begins to emerge.
Many factors will alter the course of the Medicaid program in the future; this paper
highlights major unknowns that administrators should consider and account for in planning. Since Tennessee has unique public programs and legislation regarding insurance
regulation, federal reforms will impact Tennessee in distinctive ways.
In the coming years and months, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) and the Tennessee Office of Finance and Administration will release their own
analysis that will include more comprehensive information on implementation. My goal
is to inform the numbers with history and an understanding of the expansion population.
I make no attempts to be exhaustive in my work but rather to add to existing discourse.
Part 1 explores the context of the Medicaid expansion, including the development
of Medicaid and TennCare, the current recession, and the broader health reform law. Part 2
explores an estimated net cost of $2.3 billion. First, I work to characterize the population to
be covered by the expansion. While the ultimate goal of this exercise is to understand the
impacts on the cost of the program, it reveals several strategies for cost containment and
health improvement. Second, I broadly estimate the costs of the program under set assumptions. Finally, I analyze the strength of the impact of two main variables – inflation and
enrollment. Moreover, this section looks at savings the state may realize as well as some
corollary consequences of the increased federal funding to the state.

Part 1: Context
The context of this Medicaid expansion is crucially important. Medicaid has been expanded numerous times in the past, but events do not occur in vacuums. Current economic and
political situations differ at this moment. Accordingly, in this section, I outline the history
of Medicaid and TennCare, look at the current structure of TennCare, and explore the goals
and provisions of health reform as a whole.
TennCare History

Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
—George Santayana1
Beginning of Medicaid
Medicaid and Medicare, passed under the Social Security Amendments of 1965, provided
health insurance for the elderly, the poor, the blind, and the disabled. While both are entitlement programs, unlike the categorical State Children’s Health Insurance Program, these
two programs differ in several key ways. First, Medicare provides coverage for elderly
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Americans; Medicaid provides care for the poor. Second, Medicare is operated from the
federal level while Medicaid, which does receive federal funding, is administered at the
state level. Third, each program was designed for a different purpose. Medicare was deemed
necessary because the “elderly had unique health needs which could never be addressed by
the private sector, and thus required specific government remedy.”2 In contrast, Medicaid
worked in conjunction with other period initiatives to fight the “War on Poverty.” Unlike
its cousin, Medicaid “drew little opposition from organized medicine” since the program
was seen as a “mere expansion of existing welfare programs.”3
Within five years of the creation of the Medicaid, all states – except Arizona – established Medicaid programs to expand care to the population targeted by the new program.4 They covered a portion of the poor, as well as the blind and the disabled. Eligibility
was based on welfare guidelines already in place under Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC, now Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, TANF) and administered
through existing state welfare departments.5 In the beginning, Medicaid “effectively prohibited” cost-sharing, deductibles, and co-payments.6 By providing health insurance for the
disenfranchised, program planners wanted to make care from private providers accessible
to all patients, who up to this point had been treated in public clinics and hospitals. The
program aimed to merge a two-tiered medical care system.
Medicaid was only one part of the Johnson Administration’s War on Poverty which
created programs that ranged from youth and work training to neighborhood health centers.
This “three-pronged approach drew on research indicating that the poor were disproportionately undereducated, undertrained, sick, ignorant, and isolated.”7 Still, the attack on
medical disparities did not follow the general community-focused theme of other poverty
programs because of political pressures. Instead, Medicaid left the traditional private infrastructure in place without addressing the design and coordination of the medical and
hospital systems. According to liberals at the time, “federal policy overemphasized hospital constructing, while ambulatory care was neglected.”8 In other words, Medicaid policy
continued the emphasis on hospital care set in 1946 with the Hill-Burton Act that funded
hospital construction.9
As such, Medicaid worked to integrate the low-income population into mainstream
private hospitals that provided a higher quality of care than public clinics. Since the program needed to change the way this population received care, administrators had difficulties enrolling those eligible in the program.10 In addition, states saw almost immediate
budget problems from their generous hospital-based programs and began scaling back.
Two lessons can be gleaned from the early Medicaid years that are important when
considering what methods will contain health costs. First, simply expanding coverage does
not solve all problems in the health system and specifically does not help combat rising
costs. Second, cost issues are compounded by undue emphasis on the benefits of hospital
and acute care.
Medicaid Expansions in the 1980s
Medicaid enrollment has ebbed and flowed over the past two decades. Expansions in the
late 1980s, however, put much financial stress on states, which in addition to failed national
reforms in 1993 caused many of the state-level reforms seen in the ‘90s, including the
TennCare waiver, to fail. Table 1.1 identifies both federal and Tennessee cuts and expansions in eligibility since 1981 and serves as a reference for the following discussion.
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Table 1.1: Tennessee Medicaid Coverage: State and Federal Changes, 1981 – 2014
Year
1981, 1982

1984 – 1989

Cuts or Expansions in
eligible Medicaid Population

Bill

Federal Cuts

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982

Federal Expansion

Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988
Family Support Act of 1988
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989
TennCare Section 1115 Waiver

1994

Tennessee Expansion

2005

Tennessee Cuts

Waiver Amendments

2010

Tennessee Cuts

Waiver Amendments

2014

Federal Expansion

Source: Kaiser Medicaid History ; Jonathan Engel
11

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
12

The parallels between the Medicaid expansion of the 1980s and the planned expansion are obvious, but several differences are worth noting. First, the expansion of the
1980s came through a series of eligibility expansions.13 These began in 1984 with AFDC
children under 5 and select AFDC-eligible pregnant women. Omnibus budget legislation
in 1990 then extended Medicaid to all children and pregnant women under 133 percent of
Federal Poverty Level (FPL)14 and added the Medicare cost-sharing of dual eligibles to
Medicaid’s responsibilities. In contrast, all new PPACA-eligible beneficiaries will qualify
for the program on January 1, 2014. Second, the federal government provided no financial
help during the 1980s; matching rates remained the same.15 More money was pumped into
states by the federal arm, but states were also more fully responsible for cost increases,
which brought on an increase in the number enrolled. In contrast, the federal government
will share a significant portion of costs of upcoming expansions; instead of phasing-in
coverage, they phase in cost-sharing, initially covering all expenses and the gradually reducing reimbursement levels that ultimately remain higher for newly eligibles. Third, the
scope of these mandates differ by significant amounts. Coverage twenty years ago doubled
(which represents a 100 percent increase in enrollment) whereas researchers predict a 2533 percent increase under recent legislation.16 17 In other words, the number of enrollees
jumped from 500,000 to 1,000,000 between 1987 and 1993; projected increases put the
next expansion from approximately 1,200,000 to 1,450,000. Both the raw numbers affected and the percentage change under PPACA will be smaller. Fourth, each expansion (or
set of expansions) was passed under different political environments. The expansions of
the 1980s were passed through Omnibus Budget bills which were not health-specific; the
recent expansion was passed through a comprehensive piece of health reform legislation.18
The impact of these additional reforms is addressed later.
Beginning of TennCare
As seen, the 1980s brought a gradual increase in the population states were required to
cover through their Medicaid programs. Implemented with no federal fiscal support, states
were tasked with accommodating these new enrollees; Tennessee was no exception. In five
years, enrollment doubled and expenditures tripled, leaving the state with few options.19
While enrollment likely was not the only cause of increased costs, Tennessee’s budget
could not sustain this rate of increase. The Blue Ribbon Task Force, commissioned by
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then Governor Ned McWherter and chaired by Dr. William Frist, who later became Senate
Majority Leader, gave legislators three options: 1) Increases taxes, a politically infeasible
move; 2) Reduce Medicaid services, a move counter to McWherter’s vision for the state;
or 3) Reform the delivery and financing of the current system.
Threatened with the insolvency of Tennessee’s Medicaid program in 1994, Governor
Ned McWherter led a drastic overhaul to implement a new managed care system to be
dubbed TennCare.20 The state successfully petitioned a Section 1115 demonstration waiver
to transition 800,000 enrollees to managed care in order to save costs. Additional savings,
realized by reallocating Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments, allowed the
program to expand its eligibility requirements to two additional groups – those uninsured
and the uninsurable (now referred to as “medically eligible”).
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments were designed to sustain hospitals that provide more care to Medicaid-eligible populations than other hospitals.21 States
and the federal government share these costs in the Medicaid program. Each state sets different requirements to identify eligible hospitals but must follow minimum federal guidelines. In the late 1980s, states used funding from provider taxes and local governments
to increase the amount of DSH money the state received from this uncapped source. The
rapid growth in these funds led to the passage of the Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and
Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991 (P.L. 102-234) that reduced the amount of
donated funds eligible for a federal match and capped DSH payments at 12 percent of the
Medicaid budget. This bill also locked in state contributions at 1992 levels; Tennessee was
classified as a state with “high” DSH spending since this consumed 17.6 percent of its total
Medicaid spending.22 The new law went into effect in 1993 and Tennessee faced loses of
$494 million in Medicaid payments.23 TennCare began the next year and worked with CMS
to reallocate these funds into its managed care program.
In 2005, the budget once again led Tennessee Governor Phil Bredesen to advocate
drastic action. This time, the Democratic governor and one-time health insurance executive borrowed solutions from the private sector. TennCare dropped coverage for optional groups, including those who would be otherwise uninsured because of a pre-existing
condition. Bredesen replaced the federally-matched program with a high-risk program
and with a less-expensive state-subsidized insurance program for small businesses called
CoverTN. Ample savings were possible through premium cost-sharing; the state, the business, and the beneficiary each paid one-third of the costs. In 2009, this program covered
approximately 22,000 people at a cost of $20 million, which still left many without coverage.24 This cost equals $910 per capita for the state, in contrast with the $4,106 per capita
spent on TennCare Services. AccessTN creates a high-risk pool in which individuals can
purchase coverage. The state spends $3,841 to cover each high-risk individual compared to
the estimated $7,500 spent on elderly and high-risk individuals in 2006.25
Despite these overarching changes in public programs, Tennessee saw no change in
DSH funding through its dealings with CMS. Still operating under a waiver because of the
continued reliance on managed care, federal payments for DSH hospitals were still redirected to insurers. However, the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 granted the state DSH
funds in 2007, the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA)
extended these funds through 2012, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) allocated additional DSH payments. Together, DSH funds are set to expire in
2013, just before the enactment of the Medicaid enrollment.
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Recent Recession and 2010 Cuts
Economic dips have a unique impact on public programs that serve low-income populations: while the need for the programs increase, government revenues decrease. As a result
of the current recession, most states are facing budget shortfalls. The federal government
intervened in 2009 with a stimulus bill known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA). The bill included an increase in federal matching funds for Medicaid programs, which allowed many states to lessen or delay cuts while stimulus funds were available. Tennessee also received a nine percentage point increase in its Federal Matching
Assistance Percentage (FMAP), the reimbursement rate for its Medicaid spending.
Despite stimulus funds, Tennessee’s continual decrease in sales tax revenue compounded with a continual increase in TennCare expenditures led Governor Bredesen to
propose benefit cuts in the 2010-2011 budget.26 These changes would cut therapy services
and drastically limit hospital and office care for non-institutionalized adults in order to save
$99.4 million to help address an estimated $1 billion budget shortfall. A recent decision by
CMS to return a portion of the federal share of the Medicaid drug rebate allowed the state
to postpone most of these cuts for one year.27

Current TennCare Landscape
Below, a table displays current TennCare eligibility for major categories. Like many other
states, Tennessee does not cover low-income adults who do not have dependent children.
As noted before, these eligibility levels differ drastically from the TennCare of five years
ago since they do not include Tennesseans who are uninsured due to lack of employersponsored group insurance or because of pre-existing conditions.28 PPACA expands coverage for all individuals to 133 percent FPL, which will cover previously excluded childless
adults as well as more parents. The reference income threshold column is for a family of
four.
Given its dynamic history over the past twenty years, TennCare is in a unique
position to absorb this next round of mandates. Some aspects – our reduced Medicaid
rolls and lack of DSH payments – may actually sustain Tennessee when the Medicaid
expansion is implemented. For example, I show that the reductions over the past five
years open Tennessee to more federal dollars. Since Tennessee will have more “newly
eligible” Medicaid enrollees because our current eligibility is lower, Tennessee receives a
higher match for these individuals. In addition, I examine the roll of uncompensated care
and DSH payment reductions that Tennessee largely avoids in absence of these funds.
Uncompensated care is expected to decrease since fewer individuals will be uninsured
and unable to pay their hospitals bills. Additionally, PPACA will gradually reduce DSH
Table 1.2: Current TennCare Eligibility
Category

Eligibility
(As % of FPL)

Income Threshold
(For a family of 4)
$40,792

Infant

185%

Child Age 1 – 5

133%

$29,326

Child Age 6 – 19

100%

$22,050

Pregnant Woman

185%

$40,792

Parent
Working
Non-Working

80%
70%

$17,640
$15,435

Income for a Full-Time Minimum Wage Worker: $15,080
Source: Tennessee Center for Policy Research 29; FPL Levels 30
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payments to 25 percent of their current rates. Since Tennessee receives only temporary
DSH payments, Tennessee hospitals will not receive these fiscal cuts. These ideas are further expanded in Part 2.

Health Reform
As previously referenced, the pending Medicaid expansion comes as part of comprehensive health reform. Other provisions will impact the implementation of these new Medicaid
requirements. Outlining major components of the full bill further contextualizes the
Medicaid expansion, allowing a more complete understanding of potential impacts of the
remainder of the bill. As such, before expanding on details of the expansion, I outline general goals of the bill and highlight two specific components – Health Insurance Exchanges
and the employer and individual mandates – that will impact the expansion most directly.

Goals of Health Reform
Our country ranks 37th in a report released by the World Health Organization because of
the gaps in insurance coverage and the resulting gaps in health care access of our population as a whole.31 Financial considerations remain at the core of many inadequacies in
our system. Since health care costs increase at a higher rate than base inflation, health
care costs have steadily eaten up a larger portion of our nation’s Gross Domestic Product
and accordingly have gradually priced more and more Americans out of health coverage.
In addition, health insurance companies, as logical businesses, seek to minimize loss to
maximize profits. These business techniques, however, often result in practices that block
high-risk individuals from the market and seek only the healthy to insure. In other words,
increasing costs and business awareness of bottom lines have left many uninsured. While
other factors, including lifestyle, contribute to the overall health of Americans, high inflation and incomplete insurance coverage represent core problems that Congress addressed
in recent legislation; below I outline these goals in more detail.
Advocacy groups have pushed strongly for their issues to be included in this round
of discussion. Still, PPACA, while expansive, has a limited scope. The problem of 47 million uninsured Americans has remained in the spotlight throughout, but the underinsured
population, a large subset of those insured but at risk of bankruptcy if they face a major
health crisis because of inadequate insurance coverage, have received much less attention.
Additionally, the bills put much effort into reforming the individual and small group health
insurance markets that boast exorbitant prices and discriminatory selection of customers, but ignore job-lock problems created by employer-sponsored insurance. Additionally,
Congress has given much attention to the inflation in health care, which outgrows base
inflation, since it is making health care inaccessible for more and more people. But public
health concerns are not being adequately addressed, in spite of increasing obesity and the
need for prevention. In short, PPACA makes larges strides in some areas but provides inadequate solutions for other problems.
Moreover, the rhetoric and the extent of reform has shifted over the past year as
conversations have clarified what issues will be addressed in the current bills. Public health
concerns have become less important to Congress, as the focus has increasingly shifted
to reforming the insurance system. Even delivery system reforms in the bills take a financial form – changing reimbursements – as opposed to true organizational changes. As
Gail Wilensky, senior fellow at Project HOPE and former Medicare administrator, emphasizes, tensions exist between finding quick money for financing reform and implementing long-lasting health care savings and quality improvements.32 Unfortunately, she said,
encouraging integrated delivery systems, management of chronic disease, and reducing
Pursuit: The Journal of Undergraduate Research at the University of Tennessee

30

Thigpen

[Vol. 2:1

inappropriate admissions do not show savings when scored by the Congressional Budget
Office. “The ways you get money quickly are not the ways that produce the kind of changes
you need for quality,” she told reporters.
As stated in early versions of both the House and Senate versions, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) aim is “to provide affordable, quality health
care for all Americans and reduce the growth in health care spending.”33 Of particular interest, this statement of purpose specifies accessibility of health care as the ultimate goal.
While many in the health community acknowledge the need for a wider range of reforms,
PPACA was designed with this specific goal. Major objectives can also be seen in the
President’s September 2009 address to a Joint Session,34 which identified four specific
areas of concern that clarify the purpose statement of the bill, which I summarize as: 1.
Regulating the insurance industry, 2. Covering the uninsured, 3. Reducing the growth rate
of health care inflation,35 and 4. Responsibly sustaining current public programs. Again, all
areas are insurance reforms.
More specifically, PPACA addresses the inaccessibility of insurance due to risk
selection and costs. Insurers institute many risk selection factors in order to maintain a
healthy bottom line.36 Often, this translates to denying coverage to those with pre-existing
conditions, to retroactively denying coverage, to demanding drastically higher premiums
for those in higher risk groups, and to capping total payouts for individuals. Because of
these business strategies, many Americans cannot obtain health insurance. Legislation attempts to resolve this problem, either by providing alternative coverage or by regulating
these aspects of insurance coverage. Additionally, legislation mandates coverage for individuals and employers and provides increased government assistance to meet this goal,
through subsidies and Medicaid expansions. Moreover, costs of health care are climbing
at exorbitant rates and must be controlled.37 Legislation aims to do its part to control costs,
with the understanding that the private sector needs to implement its own cost controls as
well.38
Other concerns with the bill, including the proper role of government in regards to
health and health care, have become a factor in debate. Still, reform addresses concerns
with insurance coverage of Americans and costs to individuals and government. As such,
the success of these proposals is defined both by how well they achieve goals of coverage
and cost-control and by their political viability.
Provisions in PPACA
Among many other provisions, PPACA creates a Health Insurance Exchanges in the states
(or regions), institutes mandates that could increase enrollment, and raises Medicaid eligibility. Below, I outline these three major provisions of the health reform law, each chosen
for its scope and contribution to major reform goals. Not coincidentally, these provisions
will create the most changes in public programs offered by Tennessee.

Health Insurance Exchange
Creating new health insurance exchanges, originally one of the less controversial provisions in the bill, forms the cornerstone of the reform law. The exchanges aim to make the
small group and individual insurance market more consumer-friendly to enhance competition while reducing unethical practices. The exchanges could be compared to comparison
shopping websites like Priceline39; an online interface would allow consumers to compare
rates for similar plan. Benefit plans will contain standardized benefits and provide information in an easy-to-compare format. The bill outlines four benefits categories of plans that

Pursuit: The Journal of Undergraduate Research at the University of Tennessee

2011]	Health Reform

31

would be offered that vary based on the cost amount the plan covers.40 Funding would also
be available to start health cooperatives. Subsidies would be offered within the exchange to
assist families up to 400 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) in purchasing the plans
such that their costs would not exceed 2 – 9.5 percent of their income, based on a graduated
scale. Importantly, plans in the exchange must guarantee issue and renewal to all enrollees
so no one could be denied coverage for a pre-existing condition.
Advocates of the health insurance exchanges argue they will cut costs by improving
competition. They create more uniform plans and bring them together in a more open marketplace. The offered subsidies improve the affordability, thereby increasing the consumer
base. Opponents argue that increasing the number of consumers will subsequently drive up
the costs of care; more demand translates into higher costs and counters the positive impact
of the subsidy.
In light of a federally subsidized health insurance plan, Tennessee’s CoverTN subsidized insurance program becomes redundant, as will be explored in Part 2 on “Program
Cuts and Reductions” in more depth.
Mandates
In order to reach the goal of universal coverage, the bill includes both employer and individual mandates. The employer mandate requires large- and medium-sized employers,
those with over 50 employees, to provide insurance for their employees. In some cases,
they would face a fine if they failed to cover their workers. Similarly, the individual mandate requires individuals to purchase or enroll in insurance or face a fine; in most cases,
provisions are made to ensure affordability of the insurance or to exempt those who cannot
afford the premiums (See Table 1.3). Supporters insist that both mandates must be instituted together as a critical component in ensuring that health reform as a whole is successful.
Opponents argue that mandates are simply another tax that will punish those who cannot
afford insurance.
In addition to noting that mandates are a way towards universal coverage, supporters point to the cost-shifting that now occurs when people are uninsured. Their uncompensated care is absorbed by the hospital and the government and passed along to others
via higher premiums or higher taxes. As such, all have a “shared responsibility” to obtain
insurance coverage to avoid unpaid bills. Opponents question the Constitutionality of the
mandates as well as their unintended consequences. They argue that Congress does not
Table 1.3: Summary of Mandate Penalties
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148)
as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010
Penalty: The greater of $695 ind ($2085/family), or 2.5% of household
income
Individual Mandate

Exemptions: Financial hardships, religious objections, those without insurance for less than 3 months, if the lowest plan exceeds 8% of income,
or if income is below filing threshold or $9,350 (in which case you’d
qualify for Medicaid)
Penalty: For companies that do not offer insurance - $2,000 / employee

Employer Mandate

Do offer insurance, but have people using subsidies in the exchange, the
lesser of - $3000 / person getting subsidy OR $2,000 / employee
Exemptions: Employers with under 50 employees

Source: Kaiser Health Reform Side-by-Side42
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have the authority to impose such a requirement on individual citizens.41 Further, they see
the mandates as simply a hidden tax that punishes individuals for personal decisions.
As a point of comparison, mandated car insurance receives little political fanfare.
Most states require drivers to obtain liability insurance for their vehicles to protect others
in the case of an accident. Proponents compare the health insurance mandate to car insurance mandates since both serve to protect the financial well being of others. In a car accident, the responsible party contributes to the damages. If someone needs extensive medical
care, their insurance will help them cover the costs; otherwise, the hospital incurs cost and
arguably passes these costs along to private insurance companies. Opponents point to substantive differences between the two mandates.43 A health insurance mandate, they argue,
impacts everyone, regardless of their choice to obtain specific types of property, such as a
car, so the mandate is an overreach of federal authority.
A third perspective offered by Leonard Burman of the Urban Institute compares the
mandate to tax credits for owning a home, having a dependent child, or making a charitable
contribution. These tax breaks could save a married couple $7,000 for home ownership or
$1,300 for a having a child.44 Thus, he argues, the mandate represents a mere rhetorical difference aimed at increasing the number of Americans who buy insurance.
In light of varying explanations and opinions on the individual mandate, Tennessee
residents may or may not respond to this mandate. If they do, enrollment numbers for
Medicaid may increase even though many who are Medicaid-eligible are not at risk of
incurring the penalty. This “culture of insurance” is covered in more depth later.

Medicaid Expansion
In addition, the bill will expand Medicaid eligibility to 133 percent of Federal Poverty
Level as another method to achieve universal coverage. As you may recall, current law
prohibits coverage of large portions of the population that may otherwise be eligible by
income level since many states only cover adults with children, children, and the disabled.
The new legislation would greatly expand the number of those eligible for this state coverage by including all who meet the income requirement. Table 1.4 shows the updated
TennCare eligibility that will go into effect in 2014.
Once the expansion takes effect, federal funding will divide Medicaid enrollees into
two groups – those eligible before reforms and those eligible after reforms. To assists states
with the increase in enrollees, the federal matching rate will be higher for those newly
eligible.
These two provisions – the individual mandate to obtain health insurance and the
expansion of Medicaid – have caught the attention of those concerned with state budgets.
Governor Phil Bredesen’s office reported that an earlier version of the Senate bill would
cost the state $735 million between 2014 and 2019 (Part 2 on the “Cost Estimate” includes
Table 1.4: Reformed TennCare Eligibility, 2014 (Changes in Bold)
Current Eligibility
(As % of FPL)

New Eligibility
(As % of FPL)

Income Threshold
(For a family of 4)

Infant

185%

185%

$40,792

Child Age 1 – 5

133%

133%

$29,326

Child Age 6 – 19

100%

133%

$29,326

80% working parents
70 non-working parents

133%

$29,326

Category

ALL Adults
under 65

Source: Kaiser Health Reform Side-by-Side45
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a break-down of this estimate). This large figure is particularly troubling in light of decreased state revenues and spending cuts in the existing TennCare plan. As Bredesen states
in his letter:
[B]y 2013, we expect to have returned to our 2008 levels of revenue and will have
already cut programs dramatically – over a billion dollars. At that point, we have
to start digging out – we will not have given raises to state employees or teachers
for five years, our pension plans will need shoring up, our cash reserves (“rainy
day funds”) will have been considerably depleted and in need of restoration, and
we will not have made any substantial new investments for years. There will have
been major cuts to areas such as Children’s Services that we really need to restore.
On top of these, there are all the usual obligations that need to be met – Medicaid,
for example, will continue to grow at rates in excess of the economy and our tax
revenues. It’s going to take at least a full decade to dig our way out and back to
where we were prior to the recession … These are hard dollars – we can’t borrow
them …
I would point out that the problem is entirely recession-related. If our revenues had
grown from the 2008 base at the normal average rates we have experienced over
the years – good times and bad – we would have well over $2 billion of additional
revenue in 2019 (and smaller obligations in the pension area) and would definitely
be prepared to accommodate reform.
As Governor Bredsen aptly states, the recession will force our state to make difficult
spending choices over the coming years.
Moreover, organizations and leaders from both sides of the aisle, both nationally and
locally, have voiced concern with increasing federal control as well as the fiscal obligations that will be handed down to states. In one article, the Heritage Foundation correctly
reminds readers that state participation in the Medicaid program is optional46; Arizona, for
example, did not join the program until 1982, seventeen years after its inception.47 Ending
Medicaid in the state would, however, be a drastic move that would gravely endanger both
Tennessee hospitals who have become dependent on federal matching funds to cover their
costs as well as Tennessee residents who would still be required to purchase insurance but
have no affordable option to do so. Newt Gingrich, in an American Enterprise Institute
article, argued for state-control, harkening to age-old federalist debates about the power of
the states versus the federal government.48 The National Governor’s Association, in multiple statements, emphasizes the ability of states to more accurately understand their own
fiscal limitations. As NGA Executive Director Ray Scheppach explains,
Just as no state is offering the maximum of all possible options; neither does any
state cover only the bare minimum mandates. Every state makes political and fiscal
calculations with regard to how expansive they can afford their Medicaid program
to be. Therefore, imposing broad new unfunded mandates upon states could force
them to reduce spending on optional categories.49
Accordingly, Bredesen’s cost estimate included reducing the coverage of optional
groups. Further expansion, they argue, would reduce funding for other programs. The remainder of this paper explores these concerns and outlines what the state should expect in
regards to the cost of the expansion.
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Summary and Conclusions
The Medicaid program was born of necessity and has undergone many changes in the past
four decades. Today’s Medicaid expansion occurs alongside insurance mandates, the opening of Health Insurance Exchanges, and an on-going recession. Many predictions have
been made and yet we still know little about how the public, the providers, and the payers
will respond to these changes. On top of the unknowns, unique conditions in Tennessee,
namely our lack of a state income tax, decreased enrollment, absence of DSH payments,
and our managed care program will interact with these new changes in distinctive ways.
We do know that Medicaid rolls have been previously both expanded and reduced. New
funds were allocated for the program or savings were realized from program changes in
order to expand. Through these experiences, we also know that expanding coverage alone
does not address the problem of rising costs. In other words, the Medicaid expansion will
increase costs. Many interpretations of the impact of the provisions are available; as such
the next section describes factors that could impact the ultimate cost of the expansion and
provides a vague estimate.

Costs and Savings
The following section explores factors that must be considered when working with a cost
estimate of the Medicaid expansion. In order to understand fully the components of this
estimate, I first draw on existing research to identify potential qualities of the population
the program would impact. From this discussion, I estimate that full enrollment is unlikely
and represents an upper bound. Thus, the upper bound net costs to implement the expansion of Medicaid is $2.3 billion, assuming full enrollment and health care inflation held
constant at its current high rate. The following conversation further explores parameters of
this estimate, including a sensitivity analysis of parameter assumptions.
Considerations
Before quantifying potential costs of expanding Medicaid, I outline factors that will influence the implementation – and consequently the costs – of the bill. This type of cost
estimate requires sweeping assumptions about the behavior of people in order to reach
any useful estimate. Understanding these assumptions will allow this estimate to evolve
as factors become known. I have divided confounding factors into two groups: access and
utilization factors and health factors. Each set depends on human behavior as well as how
the bill is implemented, which depends largely on decisions made by the state and by the
Department of Health and Human Services.
As such, my first task was to characterize the population that would be affected by
the Medicaid expansion and by the individual mandate. As previously noted, two groups
will enroll in Medicaid after the expansion – those currently eligible but unenrolled and
those newly eligible. Before making an estimate, it is important to understand the health
and habits of these people since the nature of this population will impact the success and
costs of this program.
The following example clarifies these types of consequences. Estimating costs requires using data on the currently enrolled Medicaid population in place of unknowns
about the newly affected populations. For example, my estimate uses the current rate of
expenditures for the currently enrolled population to estimate costs for the newly enrolled
populations assuming that covering these different populations will cost the state the same
amount. In contrast, these populations may have different types of health needs that require
differing amounts of health services.
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The following discussion draws from the work of previous researchers in order to
better understand how these factors will alter the projection that I outline later in this section. Much of this work is based on national studies, so some generalizations apply nationally; also, this analysis is not comprehensive. I examine the likelihood that this population
enrolls in Medicaid, the likelihood that they subsequently utilize health services, and the
health of this population.

Enrollment
Traditionally, public programs – health care related and non-health care related – are not
fully utilized by the eligible population. For example, the Food Stamp program reached
31 percent of its target group two years into the program; after recent outreach efforts, the
program reached 67 percent of its target but still does not enroll all eligible persons.50 Five
years after its inception, the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) enrolled 60 percent of eligible children; likewise, the Medicare Savings Program only reached 33 percent
of intended recipients ten years after creation. Accordingly, TennCare does not reach the
whole of its currently eligible population; an estimated 200,000 individuals who may be
eligible are not enrolled in this program.51 If the current Medicaid expansion follows this
pattern, only a fraction of those eligible will enroll; consequently, the state would spend
less than projected on Medicaid assuming full enrollment.
In contrast to existing programs, the current expansion is accompanied by an individual mandate to obtain the product it provides. Because the mandate will impose fines on
individuals who fail to obtain coverage, Medicaid most likely will see an increase in currently
eligibles and in newly eligibles. Still, while the exact impact is unknown, 2004 Massachusetts
reforms provide an informative case study. Similarly to national health reform, Massachusetts’
reforms included both a mandate for individual coverage as well as an expansion of public
programs. Also like national efforts, the penalty for those not covered by insurance did not
impact those at the lowest income levels, who are also the target of Medicaid programs. Even
though this population would not face a fine, they often enrolled in the program. According
to analysis by Stan Dorn, Massachusetts’ reforms, along with the accompanying public education campaigns, made it easy for people to enroll in new state health coverage programs.52
As a result of this phenomenon – as well as a host of other innovative enrollment techniques
– 97 percent of Massachusetts’ residents have health coverage. The Massachusetts example
suggests that a combination of public education and enrollment modifications can drastically
raise the rate of Medicaid enrollment. Consequently, if Tennessee employs these techniques,
the state should expect higher rates and, consequently, higher costs.
Access and Utilization
Once this population has health coverage, other factors will impede their ability to obtain
this coverage. These factors, accordingly, have both fiscal and public health impacts. Both
access and utilization will impact the extent to which this new population will utilize its
new insurance coverage. Access, or the ease with which an individual can obtain health
care, is a concern often associated with current Medicaid programs. Several factors impact
access to care, including the number of Medicaid doctors and the location of health services. First, since Medicaid reimbursements are well below those of Medicare and private
companies, providers are reluctant to see patients with this coverage. In addition, health
care facilities are often located in more wealthy, more populated areas. As a result, those
in lower-income communities have to travel farther to find needed physicians; a lack of
access to transportation compounds this problem. Due to these and other barriers to care,
patients may not receive the treatments they need, not because of inability to pay, but because of confounding factors that impede access.
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Furthermore, we cannot assume that having coverage will automatically compel
people to seek health care. Different cultures have different views on the benefits of health
care that may change their utilization rates of this care. For example, women of color often
delay prenatal care; this trend could in part by explained by different cultural views.53 Some
groups even have negative views of health care as a profession. Negative stigmas may have
prevented certain groups from pursuing coverage on their own; likewise, compulsory coverage would not be likely to compel them to see a physician even for serious conditions. If
rates of use differ, costs for the currently uninsured population could also differ.
In addition, this expansion of coverage may have a minimal additional cost because
those within that income bracket already spend-down, or spend their assets so they meet the
qualifying levels of the program. Thus, the new bill allows these sick patients to maintain
their assets while receiving medical care without drastically increasing costs for TennCare.
In contrast, however, Tennessee hospitals saw major increases in uncompensated care following the TennCare cuts in 2005.
A report by Thomas Miller finds an increased utilization of the emergency room by
those enrolled on Medicaid. If this new population follows this trend for ER use, which
seems the easiest way for new enrollees to develop a relationship with the health system,
then expenditures will increase. This trend also represents an area for cost control; if the
program can connect enrollees to the health care system at other points, the state can reduce
the use of expensive emergency care.
Another interesting story hints at the potential savings that may be seen as a result
of fully covering this population. This report, published in the New England Journal of
Medicine, compared the Medicare expenditures of those who were insured or uninsured
from ages 50 – 64 before becoming Medicare-eligible. Once of Medicaid age, the consumption of health services by those newly insured is significantly greater than the usage
by their previously-insured counterparts.54 This study supports the notion that expanding
Medicaid, at least for this population, will decrease program costs for Medicare. According
to the authors, “the costs of expanding health insurance coverage for uninsured adults before they reach the age of 65 years may be partially offset by subsequent reductions in
health care use and spending for these adults after the age of 65, particularly if they have
cardiovascular disease or diabetes before the age of 65 years.” Unfortunately, these particular savings would be felt at the federal level since states are not fiscally responsible for
Medicare unless the state sees similar savings across age groups.

Health
Understanding the health and health needs of the population of newly eligibles is another
way to estimate the potential rate at which this population will use health services. For example, if this population is generally healthier than the current Medicaid population, then
the Medicaid expansion would cost less for the state. Current research presents conflicting
pictures of the health of this population.
A 2001 study by the Urban Institute found that uninsured eligibles are in better
health than Medicaid-enrolled counterparts but still have unmet needs.55 This suggests
that expanding coverage would cost less per capita since these patients would need less
care; at the same time, expanding their coverage would enable this population to obtain
needed care. This study focused on the currently Medicaid-eligible population to determine
health differences between adults enrolled in the program, those privately insured, and
those uninsured. The study did not, however, examine the health of the total population
that meets the income criteria for Medicaid. As such, significant portions of the population were not included in this study, including childless adults and those between current
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income thresholds and the new federal flat rate at 133 percent. Consequently, this report
offers no conclusive information on the health of the entire population that will be affected
by the expansion. Still the study suggests that the cost of covering those currently eligible
but unenrolled will be less than current expenditures.
According to Thomas Miller of the American Enterprise Institute, uninsured individuals are more likely to report their health as “good to excellent,” which may suggest that
people do not buy insurance unless they are sick or at risk and need insurance coverage.56
Other studies, however, have contradictory findings. A Health Affairs paper finds that uninsured individuals have a greater chance to go with undiagnosed hypertension, diabetes,
and elevated cholesterol; these conditions are best treated early and cause greater health expenditures when discovered later.57 Undiagnosed conditions that have yet to exhibit symptoms would not prompt survey participants to characterize their health as “fair” or “poor.”
Additionally, a joint study by RAND and Price Waterhouse found that patients do not shift
medical treatments to periods in which they are insured.58 This surprising finding supports
another point made by Miller; those uninsured for just part of the year spend 75 percent
of what those with insurance do on health care. Consequently, if patients do not shift care,
access less care, and go without needed diagnoses, one can infer that the uninsured go
without necessary care, regardless of how they self-report their own health. Whether these
patients would have received this care if they were insured is quite another matter.
Based on the above-cited reports, we are no closer to categorizing the health and
potential service utilization of those who would be newly eligible for Medicaid. In the
absence of directed studies to answer this specific question, we must extrapolate from
existing research that often yields contradictory results. The Medicaid expansion assumes
that this population has conditions that need treatment, but we cannot definitively predict
whether they will access said treatments. TennCare should carefully monitor usage changes in this new population in order to develop targeted cost reduction plans.

Cost Estimate
As a result of the variability of the implementation process and the unknowns about the
expansion group, reaching an exact estimate of the cost impact of the Medicaid expansion
is not possible. Governor Phil Bredesen released an estimate of $735 million from 2014 –
2019 in October 2009 based on the language of the Senate Finance bill (See Table 2.1).59
His calculations are below for reference. My estimate of $2.3 billion over this same fiveyear time period incorporates the language of the final version of the bill. Below, I explain
the assumptions and methods used to reach this estimate. Since I was not able to obtain the
governor’s assumptions, I cannot comment directly on the large difference between the two
estimates. A different set of assumptions or use of a different data set would easily alter any
estimate. Further, my work provides a high-end estimate, while the governor seeks middle
ground. Still, my work should allow open conversation on how the state can address these
costs in a way that also benefits the health of Tennesseans.
Governor Bredesen’s estimate does present a few interesting findings. First, the state
would spend much more to cover those already eligible for coverage. In other words, the
primary fiscal concern is increased demand for a product already offered. This assumes
Medicaid eligible parents will obtain free coverage from the state instead of incur a fiscal
penalty, which also assumes that this population makes economically rational decisions.
As discussed above, neither of these assumptions is absolute. Secondly, Bredesen includes
elimination of optional groups above the new threshold as a source of savings. While it
is possible that the next governor will follow this trend, I do not include such cuts in my
estimate.
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Table 2.1: Governor’s Estimate: October 5, 2009

Projected Tennessee Net New Costs of Senate Finance Reform 2014-2019 $ millions
Best Estimate

New Medicaid Members
1. Newly Eligible Members

Optimistic

Pessimistic

$175

434

175

911

488

1361

$1086

922

1537

4. Elimination of Optional Groups >133%

$(78)

(78)

(78)

5. Additional Drug Rebates (net)

(191)

2. Already Eligible Not Enrolled
3. Total New Membership

Cost Savings Offsets

(191)

(191)

6. TN-CoverTN Elimination

(91)

(91)

(91)

7. TN-AccessTN Savings

(31)

(31)

(31)

8. TN-CoverRX Savings
9.

Additional Costs

(6)

(6)

(6)

$(397)

$(397)

$(397)

10. Mandated Pharmacy Extensions

$30

30

30

11. Presumptive Eligibility Net Costs

16

16

16

12. Total State Costs of Reform

$46

46

46

$735

571

1186

Source: Governor’s Letter to Corker60

Methods
In light of incomplete information regarding the process of implementation and the characteristics of the expansion population, assumptions were necessary for the purpose of a
cost estimate. Once these assumptions were made, calculating an estimate of the cost of the
Medicaid expansion was straightforward. The methods for choosing inflation rate, costs
per capita of new enrollees, federal reimbursement rate, and the numbers of new enrollees
are explained below. Again, given the unknowns and dynamic nature of this expansion, any
of these measures is subject to change. As such, I will later explore the sensitivity of costs
to two variables – inflation and enrollment.
Inflation was based on the figure used in the governor’s estimate to approximate
future TennCare expenses.61 This number consequently reflects the rate expected by government analysts. While the bill aims to reduce inflation, the amount to which this occurs
is unknown. Sensitivity analyses later, however, explore the impact of alternate parameter
assumptions.
All cost calculations began with the amount spent per capita on health services for
current enrollees in TennCare in 2009. (The costs for new enrollees were assumed to be the
same as costs for current enrollees.)
Table 2.2: Assumptions in Cost Estimate
Inflation

6.7%

Costs per Capita

$4,106

FMAP* for
currently eligible

64%
(2008 rate)

Newly Eligible

261,970

Currently Eligible
but not enrolled

198,130

Federal Matching Assistance Percentage
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Equation 1
2009 Per Capita Spending = Total Health Services Expenditures / Total Enrollees
Cost per capita were calculated from figures in the 2009 – 2010 state budget. The
amount spent on health care services was divided by corresponding enrollment. Longterm care was not included. Consequently, this assumes that the majority of new enrollees
will not be disabled or elderly, groups that consume the largest amount of care. Also, no
difference was made in the amount spent on children and adults even though this amount
has been shown to differ greatly. The most recent break down by status, based on 2006
data, showed a sizeable difference in children’s and adults’ costs (See Table 2.3). A more
significant difference was found between these amounts and the average spent in 2009,
excluding long-term care and home-based services used mainly for the population that is
developmentally delayed. This figure indicated a sizeable increase in services rendered to
mainly adults and children. In short, available data did not allow further differentiation for
those disabled and those who have elderly status in the cost analysis.
Two separate reimbursement rates (FMAP) were used – one for currently eligibles
and one for newly eligible. I assumed a return to the pre-stimulus FMAP – the 2008 rate
of 64 percent, which historically has held constant. Under the new law, the state receives
higher federal contributions for those newly eligible (See Table 2.4).
As a result of these higher matching rates, the state pays significantly less per capita
for these new participants. If the state unilaterally decided to expand coverage to this same
population, the state would spend an additional $816 per person (See Table 2.5).
In other words, since Tennessee will see increased matching rates for its expansion
population, Tennessee receives a more cost-effective method of increasing Medicaid eligibility levels. If the state had undertaken reform on its own, the state would pay significantly
more per capita to cover more people on Medicaid since this increased rate would not have
Table 2.3: Medicaid Payments per Enrollee, FY 2006
Medicaid Payments per Enrollee, FY 2006
Children

$1,681

Adults

$2,941

Elderly

$7,214

Disabled

$8,453

Total, 2006
Total, 2009,
excluding long-term and home care

$3,975
$4,106

Source: StateHealthFacts.org 62

Table 2.4: FMAP for Newly Eligible Medicaid Participants
FMAP for Newly Eligible
Medicaid Participants
Year

Rate

2014 – 2016

100%

2017

95%

2018

94%

2019

93%

2020

90%

Source: Kaiser Health Reform Side-by-Side 63
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been available. As shown in Table 2.6, Tennessee will spend significantly less per new
enrollee, over $2,000 in savings in 2020. Granted, the state is still required to cover this
new population.
I used data available from StateHealthFacts.org to estimate the number of Tennesseans
eligible for TennCare (See Table 2.7). Various sources do estimate the number of uninsured at different levels because they use different methods. For example, the Center for
Business and Economic Research at the University of Tennessee estimated that 616,967 or
10 percent of the population was uninsured in 2009.64 FamiliesUSA, in contrast, places that
number at 1,722,000 or 32.4 percent for of the population for 2007-2008 since it includes
anyone who went without insurance at any point during the year.65 StateHealthFacts.org is
in the middle with a 2008 estimate of 904,100 uninsured Tennesseans.66 Consequently, estimates based on different data may easily differ from those outlined below. Still, the given
estimates fall into ranges given by Heritage (250,000) and the TennCare office (200,000)
for the expansion population.67 My estimates found that approximately 260,000 will become newly eligible for TennCare and approximately 200,000 are currently eligible but
unenrolled.
Table 2.5 State Medicaid Costs Per Capita
Total Costs per Enrollee

$4106

Current State Contributions

$1030

Projected State Contributions
for new enrollees

$218

State Savings Under Reform

$816

Table 2.6: Per Capita TennCare Costs
Per capita Medicaid
costs at 6.7% inflation

Costs to state at 64%
FMAP - Current eligibles

Costs to state for newly
eligibles

2014

$5,322.02

$1,915.93

$0.00

2015

$5,678.60

$2,044.29

$0.00

2016

$6,059.06

$2,181.26

$0.00

2017

$6,465.02

$2,327.41

$323.25

2018

$6,898.18

$2,483.34

$413.89

2019

$7,360.35

$2,649.73

$515.22

2020

$7,853.50

$2,827.26

$785.35

Table 2.7: Enrollment, broken out from Population Parameters
Total

460,100

Children
Adults
Parents
Under 80%
Over 80%
Childless

69,100
391,100
258,060
129,030
129,030
132,940

Currently Eligible
Children and Parents under 80%

198,130

Newly Eligible
Parents over 80% and Childless Adults

261,970

Source: StateHealthFacts.org 68
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2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

$4,106
$4,381
$4,675
$4,988
$5,322
$5,679
$6,059
$6,465
$6,898
$7,360
$7,853

Per capita Medicaid
costs at 6.7% inflation

Total Costs to State for
Costs to state at
currently eligible but
64% FMAP not enrolled
Current eligibles
$1,109
$1,577
$1,683
$1,796
$1,916
$379,000,000
$2,044
$405,000,000
$2,181
$432,200,000
$2,327
$461,100,000
$2,483
$492,000,000
$2,650
$525,000,000
$2,827
$560,200,000
$2.7 billion

1.00
1.00
1.00
0.95
0.94
0.93
0.90

FMAP for newly
eligibles

$0
$0
$0
$323
$414
$515
$785

Costs to state for
newly eligibles

$84,700,000
$108,400,000
$135,000,000
$206,000,000
$328 million

Total Costs to state
for newly eligibles

Table 2.8: Estimated Costs of Medicaid Expansion and Increased Enrollment, 2014 - 2019

~$3 billion
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To carry out the calculations, costs per capita were indexed to inflation then multiplied by the projected number of newly enrolled and newly eligibles, respectively (See
Table 2.8). Total costs are estimated at $3 billion over five years, from 2014 – 2019. (The
year 2020 was included in the Table since the federal matching rate will continue to change
through 2020, but was not included in the cost estimate.) Savings and projected net costs
of $2.3 billion over the five-year period are discussed later. Beyond this estimate, the state
could be spending an additional $660 million a year by 2020.
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Savings
The legislation will also provide savings for the state. For the sake of scope, I focus only
on the savings that result from changing the public insurance coverage structure, or those
savings related to the Medicaid Expansion. Additional savings may be seen if inflation is
altered, if the general health of the population improves, or if the system becomes more
efficient. Savings may also be seen if the amount of uncompensated care provided by hospitals decreases; the impact of uncompensated care is discussed later.

Drug Rebate Change
TennCare provides coverage for outpatient drugs. The state pays the full sticker price upfront and is subsequently reimbursed by the pharmaceutical companies. States are allowed
to negotiate these rates with insurance companies and many states receive reimbursements greater than the 15.1 percent minimum set by CMS. The new legislation raises this
minimum threshold to raise revenue for the federal costs of the bill; consequently, the
funds from this increase will be paid to the federal government. Some reports indicate that
Tennessee will lose funds as it hands over its extra rebates; others indicate Tennessee will
in fact save money from increased rebates. In light of these conflicts, I simply leave the
impact of these changes at $0.
Program Cuts and Reductions — CoverTN
Tennessee currently operates a subsidized insurance plan called CoverTN that targets
small businesses and self-employed individuals who are uninsured. In 2014, this demographic will either be able to enroll in Medicaid or to purchase insurance in a new Health
Insurance Exchange; many will qualify for federal subsidies for their purchases. As such,
CoverTN will become a redundant program and can be eliminated. Governor Bredesen
also identified this program for elimination in his cost estimate. Below are estimated savings based on 2009 CoverTN levels and indexed to a 6.7 percent inflation rate (See Table
2.9). Eliminating this program will save the state $160 million.

Program Cuts and Reductions — AccessTN
Tennessee currently operates a high-risk insurance program called AccessTN to cover
Tennesseans who cannot obtain insurance because of a pre-existing condition.69 Since
AccessTN is not an entitlement program, Tennessee capped the program in December 2009
because of budget pressures.70 The state should see significant funding and savings from
legislation focused on high-risk and often “uninsurable” patients.
First, the bill required the implementation of a high-risk pool by June 1, 2010.
Tennessee received $97 million in federal funds for the operation of the temporary highrisk pool required by the health bill.71 Over the next four years, Tennessee had the option to
expand AccessTN or create a new high-risk pool to operate concurrently. Tennessee opted
to allow the federal government to run the new high-risk pool in the state.72 Requirements
Table 2.9: CoverTN Elimination
Years
2014 - 2015
2015 - 2016
2016 - 2017
2017 - 2018
2018 - 2019
2014 - 2019 TOTAL

Table 2.10: AccessTN Elimination
Years

$27,830,104
$29,694,721
$31,684,267
$33,807,113
$36,072,189
($159,088,393)

2014 - 2015
2015 - 2016
2016 - 2017
2017 - 2018
2018 - 2019
2014 - 2019 TOTAL

$31,877,037.51
$34,012,799.02
$36,291,656.56
$38,723,197.55
$41,317,651.78
$226,308,276.86
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for AccessTN are actually more stringent than those required for the new or expanded
program: AccessTN premiums cannot exceed an age rating of 2:1 such that premiums for
older members cannot surpass twice the premiums of younger members; premiums that
meet federal requirements cannot exceed 4:1.73 However, many are concerned that limited
funds to administer the new plans would leave state-run plans to foot the remainder of the
bill. This federal program will end at the beginning of 2014 when the Health Insurance
Exchanges (HIE) become operational.
In addition, PPACA requires all plans in an HIE to cover all patients, regardless
of pre-existing conditions. Consequently, Tennessee will have the option to phase-out
AccessTN and transition enrollees to the Health Insurance Exchange. Before Tennessee
makes this decision, it should assess the ability of this population to afford insurance
in the HIE with subsidies before ending AccessTN. In my estimate, I assume program
elimination.
Program Cuts and Reductions — CoverRX
CoverRX is a prescription assistance program that provides medications at affordable copays to those without insurance coverage.74 As the population reaches larger insurance
rates, need for this program will decline. I use Governor Bredesen’s estimate of a savings
of $6 million for this program.
Increased CHIP Contributions
PPACA includes an increase in federal funding for the Children’s Health Insurance
Program. Matching rates increase by 23 percent beginning in 2015, raising federal contributions for CHIP to 99 percent of costs. Savings of $262 million because of a 23 percentage point increase in FMAP.
Net Costs
When these costs and savings are summed, the net costs are $2.3 billion (See Table 2.11).
Because of the nature of my assumptions, this represents a high-end figure.
Sensitivity Analysis of Parameter Assumptions
Below I carry out several calculations to compare the impact of two factors – inflation and
enrollment, two factors that face the most variance during bill implementation. In order
to fully understand the impact of inflation and enrollment rates, I conducted experiments
to test the strength of each variable. Inflation varies in tests 1 – 3, from 4.7 percent as low
inflation to 8.7 percent as high inflation; enrollment is held constant. Enrollment varies in
tests 4 – 6, as a percentage of the full enrollment assumed in the cost estimate. Low enrollment is arbitrarily considered to be 33 percent, medium as 66 percent, and high enrollment
as 100 percent; inflation is held constant (See Table 2.12).
Table 2.11: Net Costs
Increase in Coverage
Additional Drug Rebates
CoverTN Elimination
High-Risk Pool Allotment
AccessTN Elimination
CoverRX Savings
Increased CHIP Contributions
Net Costs

+ $3 billion
0
- $ 159 million
- $ 97 million
- $226 million
- $6 million
- $262 million
+ 2.3 billion
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Table 2.12: Test Parameters
Inflation Rate

Enrollment (% of
full enrollment)

1.

Test for Decreasing Inflation Rate

4.7%

100%

2.

Test for Constant Inflation Rate

6.7%

100%

3.

Test for Increasing Inflation Rate

8.7%

100%

4.

Test for Low Enrollment

6.7%

33%

5.

Test for Medium Enrollment

6.7%

66%

6.

Test for High Enrollment

6.7%

100%

Table 2.13: Test Results for Inflation
Cost, 2014 - 2019

Difference*

Percent difference*

1.

Decreased Inflation

$2.66 billion

-$363 million

-12%

2.

Constant Inflation

$3.02 billion

$0 billion

0%

3.

Increased Inflation

$3.43 billion

+$412 million

+14%

Cost, 2014 - 2019

Difference*

Percent difference*

$1.03 billion

-$1.99 billion

-66%

$2 billion

-$1.2 billion

-33%

$3.02 billion

$0 billion

0%

*from cost estimate

Table 2.14: Test Results for Enrollment
4.

Low Enrollment

5.

Medium Enrollment

6.

High Enrollment

*from cost estimate

As expected, decreases in the inflation rate create savings, while increases in inflation increase costs. As a consequence, a 2 percentage point decrease in inflation would save
the state $363 million over a five-year period. Similarly, a 2 percentage point increase in
inflation would cost the state an additional $412 million (See Table 2.13).
Likewise, changes in enrollment have expected results. Enrollment rates, however, have greater influence over the amount spent on the expansions since enrollment can
vary to a greater extent than inflation. For every percent change in enrollment, cost would
change by $30 million (See Table 2.14). These findings are consistent with a recent report
published in Health Affairs that attributed the bulk of increases in Medicaid spending to
increases in enrollment.75

Indirect Savings: Uncompensated Care
Under the current health system, providers, other patients, and government entities incur the burden for uncompensated care received by uninsured persons. Some argue that
expanding health insurance coverage will correspondingly reduce the amount lost from
these medical services that are provided to uninsured persons for which they do not pay
themselves. Theoretically, if everyone who receives medical services has health insurance,
providers would receive reimbursements for all procedures, hospitals would no longer incur uncompensated care, and governments could reduce payments to hospitals that cover
these loses.
Practically, however, the absence of a uniform and comprehensive data collection
system limits our ability to accurately demonstrate these savings. A 2007 Comptroller’s
paper explores federal, state, and local expenses that cover “indigent care” within the state
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of Tennessee. The difficulties and inaccuracies in determining these exact costs can be
summarized as two major impediments. First, hospital finances for this purpose are selfreported and based on a variety of accounting practices. Losses based on the gross amounts
charged to every patient even though only a fraction of these costs are actually reimbursed
by insurers; an estimation technique is then used to determine actual costs of indigent
care from these often exaggerated figures. Second, “government expenditures are rarely
earmarked explicitly for indigent care, though many government programs likely treat individuals who are indigent.”76 In other words, identifying exact amounts spent on indigent
care is complicated since few programs solely treat this population. A more complete discussion is available in that report.
Despite these inaccuracies, I have included a series of tables to approximate and
identify funds that could be impacted by coming changes in our health system. Estimate
1 provides estimates of losses incurred by Federally Qualified Health Centers, Health
Departments, and Hospitals (See Table 2.15). While the accounting and reporting systems
differ within each category, this estimate highlights the dramatic revenue streams that each
organization foregoes in a single year.
This amount – $562.2 million – offers one incomplete estimate of the amount spent
in Tennessee on uncompensated care. The estimate, however, fails to include all providers
and all sources of uncompensated care. Physician practices not directly associated with
hospitals, freestanding clinics that do not receive federal funds, and charity clinics that also
forego federal funds are excluded from this total.
The Urban Institute has also released estimates of uncompensated care that offer a
more complete estimate of these costs (See Table 2.16).
Without reform, the Urban Institute estimates that the amount spent on uncompensated care in Tennessee could double in the next ten years, based on health care inflation
and an increase in the number of uninsured individuals. Under recent reforms, however, the
total amount spent will decrease according to its model. Above I copy a table provided by
Urban Institute that comprises these estimates on a national level (See Table 2.17). These
calculations show an estimated decrease in the amount spent nationally despite accounting
Table 2.15: Costs of Uncompensated Care in Tennessee – Estimate 1
Publically and Privately Funded Health Providers
Federally Qualified Health
Centers, 2005

Uncompensated Indigent Care
Provided to Self-Pay Patients

$23.5 million

Tennessee Rural County
Health Departments, 2006

Uncompensated Indigent Care
Provided to Self-Pay Patients

$24.2 million

Tennessee Metro County
Health Departments, 2006

Uncompensated Indigent Care
Provided to Self-Pay Patients

$23.9 million

Hospitals, Joint Annual
Report, 2005

Uncompensated Average Costs
(Not Gross Charges)

$491 million

Total:

$562.2 million

Table 2.16: Costs of Uncompensated Care in Tennessee – Estimate 277
Urban Institute
Number of Uninsured
Tennesseans (2008)

Uncompensated Care Costs
(Per Capita)

Total Uncompensated Care
Costs for Tennesseans (2008)

900,000

$1,264

$1.13 Billion

Sources: statehealthfacts.org; “The Costs of Failure to Enact Health Reform: Implications for States”, Urban Institute
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Table 2.17: Costs of Uncompensated Care Under Reform– Estimate 3*
Urban Institute
Number of un
insured (millions)

Cost per uninsured
person

Spending on Uncompensated
care (billions)

2009

49.1

$1,264

$62.1

2014

34.0

$1,588

$54.0

2019

23.0

$2,026

$46.6

.45

$2,026

$.9

Nationally

Tennessee
2019

*Note: Reflects Senate bill
Source: “The Cost of Uncompensated Care with and Without Health Reform,” Urban Institute

Table 2.18: Costs of Uncompensated Care in Tennessee – Estimate 4 - Savings
Urban Institute
No Reform – Spending in 2019

With Reform – Spending in 2019

Savings under Reform

$2.5 billion

$.9 billion

$1.6 billion

Sources: statehealthfacts.org; “The Costs of Failure to Enact Health Reform: Implications for States,” Urban Institute

for inflation in health care costs. The Tennessee estimate presented in Estimate 3 assumes
that health reform cuts the number of uninsured Tennesseans in half and projects that $900
million will be spent on uncompensated care in 2019. This total is compared with projections assuming no changes in the system in Estimate 4 and show net savings of $1.6 billion
in a single year.
The savings demonstrated – $1.6 billion – represent savings to service providers.
In order for the state budget to realize any portion of these savings, the General Assembly
must directly decrease current allocations, a task which presents fiscal and political difficulties. As previously mentioned, the budget rarely allocates funds to cover specifically
uncompensated care; as such, preemptively identifying cuts requires sophisticated guesses.
And since these funds are not earmarked for these costs, legislators face backlash from affected parties.
Such action is taken in the national reform bill. The federal law initially reduces
Disproportionate Share Hospitals (DSH) payments by 75 percent; subsequent increases will be based on the number of uninsured and the amount of uncompensated care.78
Tennessee hospitals fortunately will not shoulder these reductions in DSH payment since
Tennessee does not receive these allotments per its TennCare waiver. At the same time,
hospitals should see a reduction in the amount of uncompensated care they provide.
Federal Spending in Tennessee
The nature of the Medicaid program requires state fiscal contributions in order to receive
federal matching funds. Tennessee will be responsible for finding the additional funds to
expand this program to the federally-mandated levels. This report would be remiss, however, if federal contributions were ignored. The table above identifies federal spending
available to the state under the assumptions used to calculate the costs to the state (See
Table 2.19). Combined with the state contributions for Medicaid enrollees, health providers in Tennessee will receive an estimated revenue increase of $13 billion.
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Table 2.19: New Federal Spending in Tennessee – Medicaid (2014 – 2019)
New Federal Spending in Tennessee – Medicaid (2014 – 2019)
Currently Eligible

Newly Eligible

Total

$4.9 Billion

$5 Billion

$9.9 Billion

Summary and Findings
In other words, this section serves to clarify a vague cost estimate of $2.3 billion. First,
the research on characteristics of the population is contradictory at best. Enrollment in
most public programs is relatively low, yet Massachusetts has seen almost full enrollment.
Moreover, various cultural differences may exist within this population that naturally reduce their likelihood of pursuing care or signing up for coverage. Finally, contradictory
research on this population’s health finds them to have both better and worse health. Taken
in sum, we can only generalize about the enrollment, usage, and expenses that will be incurred from the expansion population.
As such, assumptions were made that assumed full enrollment with a constant high
inflation rate of 6.7 percent. Costs for five years are estimated at $3 billion. Savings from
eliminating redundant programs and increased federal funding are estimated at $0.7 billion, leaving nets costs at approximately $2.3 billion. The severity of impact of enrollment
is much greater. In other words, most variation in cost will come from the number of people
who sign up as opposed to from inflation.

Conclusion
From its beginning days through recent cuts, Medicaid and TennCare have grappled with
health care costs and attempted to balance increased enrollment with the necessary increased costs. This struggle will continue when Medicaid enrollment increase in 2014 but
will do so in a rapidly changing health care environment. Corresponding changes that
result from PPACA will create a dynamic market that is difficult to predict. Similarly,
the fiscal implications to the Tennessee state budget are nearly impossible to accurately
predict. The figures presented by this paper should not be used as exact sums but rather as
starting points.
As Health and Human Services unveils more details on reform implementation,
Tennessee should remain responsive to changes. During the first years of the new changes,
Tennessee would be well served to collect as much data as fiscally and feasibly possible in
order to uncover trends that will aid in planning.
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